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Abstract
This paper suggests an improvement to the assumptions underlying the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve. The Curve rests on the assumption that price con-
strained producers commit to align their production along the demand curve,
bypassing profit maximization. This assumption unnecessarily makes demand-
driven supply a postulate instead of a result. This paper shows price constrained
producers align their production along the demand curve, without commitment,
if faced with constant marginal costs, and that this supposes additional agents,
retailers. Furthermore, the paper restates how without this commitment, but
with increasing marginal costs, the New Keynesian Phillips Curve is invalid and
prices are acyclical, not procyclical.
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1 Introduction
Research on price rigidity culminated, with Roberts (1995) and Yun (1996), on the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC). Helped by the popularity of Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, the NKPC dominates as the standard model of
inflation in modern macroeconomics. DSGE models came to the forefront of macroeco-
nomics starting with Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2003). Academia uses them to test theories while central banks and international in-
stitutions rely on them as forecast models.1 The NKPC emerged as a central part and
permanent fixture of these popular models.
However, an assumption, made in the middle of constructing the curve, is unusual.
The NKPC manipulations set the production of constrained producers (those that
cannot reset price in the NKPC specification) along the product’s demand curve.2
According to marginal behavior, producers that cannot reset their price should choose
production levels so marginal costs are coherent with the imposed prices. Therefore,
a binding price constraint should lead to a surplus or penury in the product’s market,
akin to a price ceiling or floor. These producers would reduce production when facing
low prices instead of increasing them (while unconstrained producers react only to
relative prices). Consequently, this type of price rigidity will not produce procyclical
inflation.
The commitment assumption is akin to posing a Keynesian result instead of deduc-
ing it from assumptions that are more general. My contention is that the assumption
was never a big deal because it was deemed necessary. The paper suggest otherwise.
To fix the issue, Section 2 investigates constant marginal costs. Constant marginal
costs make producing along the product’s demand curve not an assumption, but a
result. It comes at the price of additional, though more realistic, assumptions. Specif-
ically, additional agents, retailers, buy from producers, who act in perfect competition
with increasing marginal costs, then sell to consumer under monopolistic competition
with a constant (the wholesale price) marginal cost.
The wholesale price makes the retailer’s supply curve horizontal. The markup from
1Sims (2012) and Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010) discuss the historical development
and current importance of DSGE modeling in academic work, while Dotsey (2013), Smets, Christoffel,
Coenen et al. (2010) and Botman, Karam, Laxton et al. (2007) discuss its use by central banks and
international institutions.
2For example, in (Woodford, 2003, Part 1, Chapter 3, p. 155): “I assume that the supplier of good
i is committed to supply whatever quantity buyers may wish to purchase at the predetermined price
pt(i), and hence to purchase whatever quantity of inputs may turn out to be necessary to fill orders.”
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monopolistic competition acts as a buffer keeping them profitable when relative prices
drop. With constant prices, marginal changes in profits depend on the evolution of
marginal costs, and constant marginal costs mean marginal profits do not decrease
with each additional unit. The retailer wants to supply the maximum that demand
allows without being forced to by a previous commitment.
As for producers, they cannot face constant marginal costs in a macroeconomic
model where production involves diminishing returns to scale. Most macroeconomic
models use constant returns to scale at the steady state. But in the short term (of inter-
est to Keynesians), microeconomics expect diminishing returns. In fact, real rigidities
on capital or investments create short-term diminishing returns. Putting a retailer be-
tween producer and consumer alleviate this difficulty by permitting diminishing return
at an earlier stage of production.
In a way, the assumption of commitment is acceptable: people put what they want
in contracts. The contract stipulates a one sided commitment that does appear in
reality, though not frequently. By contrast, retailers exist, and they are the natural
intermediary between producers and consumers. Consumers usually deal with retailers
to buy their goods3. Furthermore, putting monopolistic retailers between producers
and consumers in this context is common. For example, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999) incorporates retailers to the price rigidity model to avoid aggregation issues
relating to producers engaging in financial transactions, and Walsh (2005), in labor
market transactions.
Section 3 shows how much damage comes from avoiding both rival assumptions.
Simple algebra shows standard microeconomic assumptions result in an intractable
model with uninteresting results. Consequently, price rigidity relies on one of these
assumptions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains how a model with retailers
leads back to the original NKPC, without the need of the commitment assumption.
Section 3 details results from the model with neither the commitment, nor the constant-
marginal-costs assumptions. Finally, Section 4 offers concluding remarks.
3Although retailers are much less frequent in services, appointments are. Appointments means
there is no commitment to supply whatever quantity buyers may wish to purchase.
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2 Consumers, producers and retailers
This section is divided into three subsections. The first two subsections are conventional
and meant to establish the problem and the equations used later. Subsection 2.1 details
the choices of the consumer and Subsection 2.2 poses constant marginal costs and shows
the results. Finally, Subsection 2.3 applies those results to a model with retailers.
2.1 Consumers
The NKPC combines monopolistic competition and price rigidity to create a struc-
tural model where marginal costs drive inflation. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregation
implements monopolistic competition and Calvo (1983) contracts implements price
rigidity. As a result, producers individually set their prices as a function of marginal
costs and of the probability of being able to change them in the future; aggregation
and log-linearization do the rest. The resulting equation is the NKPC,
pit = γct + βEtpit+1,
where pi represents inflation, c, marginal cost, β, the discount factor and γ = (1 −
ω)(1 − βω)/ω, where ω represents a producer’s probability of not being able to reset
price in a given period. A presents the other standard assumptions behind the model.
In addition, Woodford (2003) provides further details and discussion.
In the familiar consumer side equations, a representative consumer optimizes using
cost minimization subject to a given utility level, or
min
yi,t
∫ 1
0
pi,tyi,tdi subject to Yt =
(∫ 1
0
y
ε−1
ε
i,t di
) ε
ε−1
,
where pi,t and yi,t respectively represent the price and production of producer i at
time t and Yt represents the aggregate production measure at time t.
4 The constraint
represents a CES utility function for a continuum of products. The minimization results
in the first order conditions that consist of the utility constraint and
pi,t − PtY
1
ε
t y
− 1
ε
i,t = 0,(1)
4For readability, throughout the paper, subscript i refers to producers who may be constrained or
not, j, to unconstrained producers and k, to constrained producer. Subscript r refers to retailers. In
one (obvious) instance, the subscript will not include all the producers of its type.
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where Pt represents the Lagrange multiplier, but also represents the price index, or the
marginal utility of an additional unit of aggregate production.
2.2 Producers
This section supposes a common constant marginal cost for producers. The specifica-
tion’s analysis shows that, although some producers may refuse to produce, the NKPC
fares well.
If marginal costs are increasing, constrained producers see their marginal profits
drop when they produce more. This is textbook microeconomics; it leads to the in-
creasing supply curve shown in Figure 1. But if marginal cost are constant, the supply
curve flattens and constrained producers rationally produce as much as the consumer
asks, making the commitment assumption unnecessary. The only problem arises when
relative prices drop below real marginal costs.
With constant marginal costs, constrained producers refuse to produce with prices
below a certain level. The problem admits only a border solution,
yk,t =
 0 if pk,s < Ptc¯t(pk,t
Pt
)−ε
Yt if pk,s ≥ Ptc¯t
,
where c¯t represents the common marginal cost. Low enough relative prices mean de-
creased production, with some producers halting production.
Using the fact that by construction, pj,t ≥ Ptc¯t for unconstrained producers and
inserting the solution in the utility constraint equation, yields
Yt =
(∫
[pk,t<Ptc¯t]
0 dk +
∫
[pi,t≥Ptc¯t]
(
P εt Ytp
−ε
i,t
) ε−1
ε di
) ε
ε−1
.
Then, isolating Pt generates the price index,
Pt =
(∫
[pi,t≥Ptc¯t]
p1−εi,t di
) 1
1−ε
.(2)
This index does not behave well. Specifically, the integral’s support depends on the
price index as it more or less counts the number of pi,t above the cutoff point.
Because of the markup though, production continues. Here the markup actually
serves a purpose unlike in Section 3, a section robust to whether producers price over
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or at marginal cost. Producers take a hit, but continue production by gnawing at their
markup since they still make a profit as long as they face a small enough price change.
For large-enough markups, say larger than the largest inflation-prediction error, the
price index, equation (2), coincides with the New Keynesian one (one without the
constrained support) because the inequality restriction never binds.
2.3 Retailers
Assuming constant marginal cost in a macroeconomic model leads to difficulties because
macroeconomic models often pose increasing marginal costs in the short term, as with
investment adjustment costs or variable capital utilization. The solution is to separate
production and distribution into two types of agents: producers and retailers. That
way, production can involve increasing marginal costs, yet the consumer still deals with
sellers that produces (distributes) under constant marginal costs.
In the first stage of a product’s life, a continuum of producers produces with in-
creasing marginal costs. They act in perfect competition, selling at marginal cost
to retailers. As a result, every producer sets marginal cost equal to the competitive
wholesale price. A wholesale price (in real terms for simplicity) of qi,t from producer i,
yields
qi,t = c(yi,t) = qt,
where c is the real marginal cost function, and competition makes every qi,t the same,
qt.
In the second stage, retailers act in monopolistic competition, selling to the con-
sumer at a markup over the price they paid, the wholesale price. For a retailer, the
wholesale price represents its marginal cost, the rest of the costs consisting of fixed
costs (rent on the store surface, clerk wages or other). For example, we could suppose
that monopolistic competition arises from the consumer’s need to travel to stores, po-
sitioned at different parts of town generating finite elasticity of substitution between
stores, shoe leather costs essentially.
Consequently, real total cost equals the real wholesale price times product, qtyr,t for
retailer r, and real marginal cost equals the real wholesale price, qt. The intertemporal
profit maximization problem of retailer r becomes
max
pr,t
{
Et
∞∑
s=0
ωsβs
(
Yt+s
Yt
)−ρ
(pr,tyr,t+s − Pt+sqt+syr,t)
}
,(3)
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where ωs represents the probability, uniform across producers, for a producer of not
being able to reset price until time t+s. The CRRA stochastic discount factor discounts
profits, with β, the ordinary discount factor, and ρ, the relative-risk-aversion coefficient.
The first order conditions come after inserting yr,t from equation (1) into equation
(3) before optimization, yielding
Et
∞∑
s=0
ωsβs
(
Yt+s
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+s
Pt
)ε
((1− ε)pr,t + εPt+sqt+s) = 0.
Consequently, the usual manipulations behind the NKPC apply for a high enough
markup, and lead to an inflation equation,
pit = γqt + βEtpit+1.
Furthermore, because qt = ct(yi,t) for every producer i, that inflation equation reverts
back to the NKPC.
In practice, most retailers’ markups go over even 1970s levels of inflation. For
example, most small retailers choose a markup at about two times the wholesale price.
Retail calls it the keystone markup. Barsky, Bergen, Dutta et al. (2002) describe other
examples of markups. In practice, the inequality restriction rarely binds.
Thus, adding retailers to the list of the agents in the model fixes the NKPC at little
conceptual costs.
3 Increasing marginal costs without commitment
This section makes the point that without one or the other assumption made earlier,
price rigidity is not Keynesian. The arguments will remind older readers of disequilib-
rium economics.5 But they bare repeating in a succinct exposition, since, as shown in
Backhouse and Boianovsky (2005), disequilibrium economics is fading into obscurity.
Subsection 3.1, on the choices of constrained producers, explains the difference
between standard optimizing behavior and commitment to fulfill demand. It parallels
the disequilibrium literature. Subsection 3.2 simply applies the results to aggregate
production, and shows that standard optimizing behavior leads to an intractable price
5For a description and a history of disequilibrium economics, see Backhouse and Boianovsky (2013),
or the working paper version, Backhouse and Boianovsky (2005).
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index. Finally, Subsection 3.3 shows why equilibrium is impossible if price rigidity
matters.
3.1 Constrained producers
The arguments of this exposition hinge on the constrained producer’ supply curve. Con-
strained producers face a static, one-period optimization problem. A price constrained
producer k chooses yk,t to maximize profits, pk,tyk,t−PtCt(yk,t), where C represents the
total cost function. Replacing pk,t from equation (1) before profit maximization yields
Lerner’s formula,
pk,t =
ε
ε− 1Ptct(yk,t),(4)
where c represents the marginal cost function. Lerner’s formula determines supply of
a constrained producer whenever the producer can sell all its output.
Whenever the producer cannot sell all its output, he/she produces along the demand
curve. Since constrained producers face price constraints, not production constraints,
they choose a production level along the consumer demand curve when the relative
price they face is too high. Producers produce only what they can sell when facing
a relative price too high for a perishable product. If the relative price is too low,
constrained producers choose a production level along the supply curve (marginal cost
and markup). Hence, these producers set production to the minimal production level
between the supply and demand curves.
Considering both supply and demand constraints yields the rationing rule,
yk,t = min
{
c−1t
(
ε− 1
ε
pk,t
Pt
)
,
(
pk,t
Pt
)−ε
Yt
}
,(5)
where c−1 represents the inverse of the marginal cost function.
The lower part of the supply curve — the part with sufficient demand — simply
represents marginal cost augmented by a markup. The markup does not vary; it does
not act as a buffer permitting producers to act irrational. Only a constant marginal
cost permits the markup to behave like a buffer. In fact, if constrained producers price
without markup, at marginal cost (pk,t = Ptct(yk,t)), every point made in this section
remains valid.
For its part, the NKPC poses that constrained producers commit to a production
level along the consumer demand curve so the demand function, equation (1), always
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Figure 1: Production determination for a constrained producer
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Note: A low relative price can mean a decrease or an increase in production for constrained producers
depending on how producers set supply. Unconstrained producers are unaffected as they adjust to
changes in relative prices.
applies. Hence, the point of contention of this paper: producers ignore profit maxi-
mization and their own supply incentives. In other terms, the NKPC supposes some
kind of commitment possible to keep producers from behaving rationally in the future.
Furthermore, marginal costs end up the same for every producer as a result of NKPC
assumptions. Imagine a producer forced to sell at lower price than other producers did.
That producer can choose its production level, he or she should decrease production
since this producer needs to decrease production to decrease marginal cost and regain
or increase profitability. Otherwise, the producer is irrational.
Figure 1 illustrates both approaches. In the figure, P o represents the optimal price
index from the standpoint of some constrained producer, while P l and P h represent
respectively lower and higher price indexes than P o. The commitment assumption,
from standard NKPC manipulations, associates P h with increased production yielding
a model where producers, when forced to sell at low relative prices, produce more. If
using standard-microeconomic behavior instead, any deviation from P o lowers produc-
tion. A surprise rise in the price index does not raise production; in fact, any surprise
lowers production.
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3.2 Aggregate production
The standard manipulations pose the intertemporal profit maximization problem of
the unconstrained producer j as
max
pj,t
{
Et
∞∑
s=0
ωsβs
(
Yt+s
Yt
)−ρ
(pj,tyj,t+s − Pt+sCt+s (yj,t+s))
}
,(6)
where C represents real total cost as a function of production, which is common to all
producers.
The first order conditions come after inserting yj,t from equation (1) into equation
(6) before optimization, yielding
Et
∞∑
s=0
ωsβs
(
Yt+s
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+s
Pt
)ε
((1− ε)pj,t + εPt+sct+s(yj,t+s)) = 0.(7)
With the commitment assumption, the demand function applies to every product,
and yields a simple price index,
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
p1−εi,t di
) 1
1−ε
,(8)
from a straightforward insertion of the demand functions into the utility constraint. In
turn, because of the symmetry of producers, the price index solves recursively to
P 1−εt = (1− ω)(p∗t )1−ε + ωP 1−εt−1 ,(9)
where ω also acts as the share of constrained producers and p∗t represents the optimal
price common to unconstrained producers. Lagged prices appear because every pro-
ducer has a uniform probability, ω, of not being able to reset its price, thus creating a
mirror image of the price index.
The NKPC therefore relies on the equation (9) to yield contemporary inflation
through Pt−1 by combining the equation with equation (7) after manipulations involv-
ing log-linearization. Note the unidentified level of the P ’s in equation (7), a homo-
geneous function in only contemporary or future (not fixed in advance) prices. Past
prices in equation (9) and marginal costs in equation (7) produce an inflation equation,
the NKPC. I will spare readers the straightforward subsequent manipulations.
On the other hand, a supply function consistent with microeconomics does not
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produce a well-behaved price index. The price index, generated from equation (5), is
solved by isolating Pt from
Yt =
∫ zt
0
c−1t
(
ε− 1
ε
pk,t
Pt
) ε−1
ε
dk +
∫ 1
zt
((
pi,t
Pt
)−ε
Yt
) ε−1
ε
di

ε
ε−1
,
where zt represents the proportion of producers that set price equal to marginal cost
augmented by a markup at time t. In addition, the proportion of producers that
along with facing price constraints, also set production along the demand curve equals
(ω− zt), while the proportion of unconstrained producers equals (1−ω). Moreover, zt
depends on the other variables. This proportion varies through time according to the
movement of that very price index, a price index that makes it impossible to generate
the aggregation in equation (9).
Of course, generating the aggregation equation is not the point. The point is,
the resulting inflation equation, if such an inflation equation possible, will not imply
procyclical inflation. The rest of this paper will not determine what this inflation
equation looks like, because the equation would be uninteresting. New Keynesians
justify the assumptions behind the NKPC with a certain result, procyclical inflation.
Finding an inflation equation free of that result offers little value.
3.3 The impossibility of equilibrium
This subsection supposes that somehow there exists a macroeconomic argument re-
stricting the constrained producers’ product equilibrium always in the intersection
between the demand curve and the supply curve. This specification’s analysis shows
the model creates a proportionality between prices and nominal marginal costs that
makes the NKPC vanish and a model of inflation impossible.
When demand equals supply for every constrained producer, the first order con-
dition, equation (7), yields, by imposing pj,t =
ε
ε−1Ptct+s(yj,t+s), ∀s > 0 (note the
summation now starts at 1),
ω0β0
(
Yt
Yt
)1−ρ (
Pt
Pt
)ε (
(1− ε)pj,t
Pt
+ εct(yj,t)
)
+Et
∞∑
s=1
ωsβs
(
Yt+s
Yt
)1−ρ (Pt+s
Pt
)ε (
(1− ε) pj,t
Pt+s
+ (ε− 1) pj,t
Pt+s
)
= 0,
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which simplifies to
pj,t =
ε
ε− 1Ptct(yj,t).
This equation for unconstrained producers is the same as equation (4) for constrained
producers. Therefore, both constrained and unconstrained producers set marginal costs
according to the same rule, Lerner formula.
As a result, the price index, equation (8), becomes
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
(
ε
ε− 1Ptct(yi,t)
)1−ε
di
) 1
1−ε
.
Meaning nominal marginal costs proportional to the price index, or simply put,
(
ε
ε− 1
)1−ε ∫ 1
0
ct(yi,t)
1−εdi = 1.
The price index disappears; real marginal cost does not influence it. Consequently,
because of the symmetry between producers, the price level does not influence produc-
tion. This result holds not only when some producers are constrained in the price they
set, but also when those that can set their price have to consider its effects on future
profits. Although still technically valid, equation (9) becomes irrelevant.
Ergo, equilibrium between supply and demand for every producer leads to the price
index disappearing and the NKPC not existing. The disappearance of the price index,
essentially a nume´raire, appears a logical consequence of posing equilibrium, because
the nume´raire always disappear in ordinary microeconomic models.
This specification shows something already suspected: the NKPC fundamentally
rests on disequilibrium, thus highlighting, as did Mankiw (2006), the kinship between
disequilibrium economics and New Keynesian economics. New Keynesian markets
clear though because the producers (with the commitment assumption) or the retailers
(without it) assume the risks of this disequilibrium.
4 Conclusion
The paper showed the NKPC can rely on a more realistic assumption involving retailers.
Furthermore, it restates how no commitment to fulfill future demand combined with
increasing marginal costs lead to a complicated and acyclical inflation equation, but
also how equilibrium between demand and an increasing supply means no inflation
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equation is possible.
Overall, the paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of what the Phillips
Curve is and means. This will have implications as research extending the NKPC could
use, or have to contend with, the new assumptions.
Furthermore, the beauty of incorporating retailers to the price rigidity model comes
from researchers not having to alter their models or codes, but just writing a short
description of the new assumptions.
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A Standard assumptions behind the NKPC
This appendix presents the other assumptions of the model:
Assumption 1 There is one representative consumer who values products with a con-
stant elasticity of scale (CES) function with an elasticity parameter, ε.
Assumption 2 The consumer faces time preferences represented by a constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) function with a risk-aversion coefficient, ρ and an ordinary
discount factor, β.
Assumption 3 The consumer ultimately owns every producer, so the consumer’s sto-
chastic discount factor determines profit discounting.
Assumption 4 Producers are symmetrical and each produces a differentiated and per-
ishable product.
Assumption 5 Every producer faces a constant probability ω of not being able to reset
its price at the next period.
Assumption 6 All production goes into consumption, none into capital.
For simplicity and exposition, the standard model makes these assumptions inten-
tionally too restrictive. Researchers can replace Assumptions 2 and Assumptions 3
by posing another reasonable stochastic discount factor. They usually also generalize
Assumption 6.
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